CdT-apxb-tactics

Appendix B Tactical Aspects of the Coup d’État In the decisive (active) phase of the coup, the forces we have acquired by infiltrating and subverting the system of state security will be used to seize certain objectives or to neutralize selected facilities. To do this, force will be essential, but because bloodshed could have unfortunate destabilizing effects, we should arrange matters so that the threat of force rather than its actual use will suffice to achieve our objectives. In this appendix, we will analyze two main problems: (a) the formation of the active teams and their operational use and (b) the deployment of the blocking forces. In both cases, our two major preoccupations will be to avoid or minimize bloodshed and—more important— to ensure that our position is not threatened after the coup by a usurpation of our power on the part of the soldiers and police we have recruited. The Formation of the Active Teams Our infiltration of the armed forces and police of the state may have been either general and diffuse or concentrated within a few large formations. In the first type of infiltration, the forces we have subverted will consist of many small subunits, whose commanders have decided to join us while their more senior colleagues—who command the unit as a whole—have remained outside the scope of our infiltration; in the second type of infiltration, a few large units have come over to us en bloc with all, or most, of their entire establishment. The two alternatives are illustrated in Table B.1. Table B.1. Eve of the coup: forces of the state fully subverted (notional) Diffuse—infiltration Concentrated

3 companies of brigade X 2 battalions of brigade X 6 companies of brigade Y 1 battalion of brigade Y 7 companies of brigade Z 1 battalion of brigade V 4 companies of brigade U Total forces = 3,000 men Total forces = 3,000 men Both types of infiltration have their advantages and disadvantages. If we have subverted many small subunits, we will have some additional protective cover because the supporters of the pre-coup regime will not be able to readily identify which units have remained loyal and which have joined us; it will also be useful to be able to confront loyalist forces with teams made up from their own cadres. The subversion of a few large units, on the other hand, will minimize the problems of coordination and recognition and, more important, will increase the security level before the coup because within each large unit there would be a measure of mutual surveillance that would deter defections to the regime or leaks to the security agencies. After the active phase of the coup, however, a composite force made up of many small subunits will be much more secure because it will reduce the risk of a usurpation of our position on the part of our military allies. There are three main reasons for this: (a) the rank of the officers concerned will obviously be lower if they are the appointed commanders of small units rather than large ones, (b) it will be easier to disperse our forces after the active phase of the coup if their concentration is not organic but a construct of our own, and (c) the larger the number of independent unit leaders involved in the coup, the less likely they are to combine in order to exclude us from power. Whatever the sources of the forces that we have incorporated, it will often be necessary to restructure them for the purposes of the coup because the many specialized tasks will require widely different teams; only if we have numerical superiority or its equivalent over the loyalist forces will we be able to use the formations we have subverted in their natural state. We will need three types of teams, as well as the blocking forces, and these will correspond to the three types of targets discussed in Chapter 5; we will, therefore, draw on the pool of subverted units and individuals to form the required number of A-, B-, and C- teams. The A-teams will be needed in order to seize the major defended objectives, among them the residence of the ruler, the main radio-television station, and the army and police headquarters. These will be both larger in size and more sophisticated in structure than the other two types of teams. Each A-team will consist of four elements whose relative size will vary with each particular target: (a) A “civilian” penetration group. This will be very small and will consist of a few men in civilian clothes carrying concealed weapons or explosives. Their function will be to enter the target as open and legitimate “visitors” in order to assist in its seizure from the inside. This assistance can be a direct internal assault, or it can take the form of an internal diversion; in the case of the broadcasting facility, however, their main function will be to prevent the use of its installations to raise the alarm. (b) A “diversion” group. This group will be important in proportion to the size of the forces deployed to protect the target. Where there might be an entire infantry formation assigned to protect the target (as in the case of the royal or presidential palace), a diversion designed to attract part of the loyalist forces will be essential. The diversion group will carry out its function by creating a disturbance, or by actually carrying out an assault on a nearby secondary target. The diversion should be timed to include the reaction time of the loyalist forces and their route time to the scene of the disturbance, after which the main assault on the primary target will take place. (c) A “covering fire” group. This will be a small group, but it will include troops with heavier weapons, especially armored fighting vehicles. Its function will be to deter resistance on the part of the loyalists by giving demonstrations of firepower, and to prevent the intervention of loyalist forces from elsewhere by covering approach routes. (d) An assault group. This will be, by far, the largest group, and its members should be chosen on the usual criteria of combat proficiency, though hopefully their skills will not be needed. The integrated operation of the different groups of each A-team is illustrated in Figure B.1. The B-and C-teams, whose functions are, respectively, to arrest political personalities and to sabotage selected facilities, will not face significant tactical problems. Their organization will be a matter of forming small teams equipped with suitable transport, of designating the target, and of coordinating the timing. Each team will consist of a couple of jeep-loads of troops or police accompanied by a member of our inner group—in the case of the major political personalities —or by a technician—in the case where the sabotage requires a measure of expertise. Figure B.1. “Sophisticated” seizure of major defended targets. The Deployment of the Blocking Forces Although it is to be hoped that the pre-coup regime will be unaware of the timing of our particular coup, it will probably be conscious of the danger from coups in general. Regimes in politically unstable countries often go to great lengths to maintain a force of politically reliable troops or armed police on which they rely against threats to internal security. Its officers often share the ethnic and/or religious affiliation of the ruling group, and special safeguards are employed to ensure the force’s political reliability. The infiltration of such “palace guards” is very difficult, and we may well have deliberately decided to exclude them from the scope of our infiltration. Elsewhere, even where every major force has been fully subverted or internally neutralized, we will still be vulnerable to unexpected defections or coincidental transfers of uninfiltrated troops. For all these reasons, therefore, the blocking forces designed to insulate the capital city from the intervention of loyalist forces will be essential because, as has been repeatedly emphasized, the intervention of determined loyalist forces —however small in number—could have effects disproportionate to their size. The operation of a blocking force is the exact opposite of an ambush: while the objective of an ambush is to inflict maximum damage without controlling passage, the objective of the blocking force is to prevent passage while inflicting minimum damage. The general structure of the blocking position is shown in Figure B.2, but two essentials are missing: (a) correct intelligence about the location and intentions of the loyalist forces and (b) the efficient use of natural barriers (such as bridges, tunnels, densely built-up areas, etc.) and of subsidiary roadblocks to channel any loyalist force into the blocking position. Figure B.2. General structure of blocking position. The area of constrained passage on the diagram represents the group of roads or streets that an intervention force must use in order to enter the city from a particular direction; it is not generally meant to represent a single road or street, though, in particular settings, this may be the case. The “observation line” (or “screen” in military terminology) attempts to infiltrate around the blocking position that may be made by dismounted loyalist troops. The “symbolic” roadblocks deployed across the set of roads or streets concerned will dissuade the loyalist forces by appealing to “orders” and comradeship; if dissuasion fails, they will try deterrence by pointing out the main defensive forces and the anti-tank positions (or the tanks if available). The operational leadership of the main defensive forces, the “teeth” of the blocking position, will have to be chosen carefully to ensure a determined defense if force is in fact used by the loyalist troops; they must also be made aware of the damaging consequences that might ensue if the blocking position degenerates into an ambush.