CdT-ch05-execution

Chapter 5 The Execution of the Coup d’État As soon as the moral power of national representation was destroyed, a legislative body, whatever it might be, meant no more to the military than a crowd of five hundred men, less vigorous and disciplined than a battalion of the same number. —Madame de Staël, referring to Napoleon’s coup d’état I came in on a tank, and only a tank will evict me. —Abu Zuhair Yahya, Iraqi prime minister, 1968 The active phase of a coup is like a military operation—only more so. If the general principle of tactics is the application of force at the right place, the coup achieves this with surgical precision by striking at the organizational heart of the whole state; if speed is very often important in military operations, in the coup it is an essential requirement. But the coup differs from most military operations in one crucial respect: while in war it is often advantageous to retain some forces as reserves to be used in later (and possibly more critical) phases of the fighting, in a coup the principle of total commitment applies. The active stage takes place in one short period of time, and forces held back today will be useless tomorrow: all our forces must be used in our single decisive engagement. The fact that the coup has practically no time dimension means that we will not be able to correct significant errors made during its execution; in war, tactics can be changed, weapons can be replaced, plans reshaped, and soldiers retrained on the basis of combat experience; in the coup, however, there will not be sufficient time for any feedback mechanism to work. In this, the coup is similar to the most modern form of warfare, the strategic missile strike, and the time factor places the entire burden of decision making in the planning stage. Every target must be studied in detail before the coup. The team assigned to seize it must match it in terms of size and composition; its every move must be planned in advance, and no tactical flexibility can be allowed. With this degree of detailed planning, there will be no need for any sort of headquarters structure in the active stage of the coup; if there is no scope for decision making, there is no need for decision makers and their apparatus. In fact, having a headquarters would be a serious disadvantage: it would constitute a concrete target for the opposition—one that would be both vulnerable and easily identified. As soon as the coup starts, the ruling group will know that something is happening, but unless coups are very frequent in the country, they will not know what that something is; it could be a mutiny, an insurrection, the opening of a guerrilla war, or even the beginning of an invasion by a foreign power. All these forms of conflict represent threats to the regime, but they are all different in terms of their immediate significance and—more important—in terms of the measures required to meet them. We should avoid taking any action that will clarify the nature of the threat and thus reduce the confusion that is left in the defensive apparatus of the regime. Our teams will emerge from their bases and proceed to seize their designated targets while operating as independent units; their collective purpose and their coordination will remain unknown until it is too late for any effective opposition. The leaders of the coup will be scattered among the various teams, each joining the team whose ultimate target requires his presence; thus, the spokesmen for the coup will be with the teams that will seize the radio/television stations, and the prospective chief of police will be with the team whose target is the police headquarters. As each team will be both small and highly mobile, and as there will be no functioning headquarters throughout the active phase of the coup, the opposition will not have any single target on which to concentrate its forces. In this way, their numerical superiority will be dissipated, and the smaller forces of the coup will have local superiority in the area of each particular target. This will be the key to the victory of the coup. On the Eve In Chapters 2 and 3 of this book, we surveyed the planning of the coup in terms of the neutralization of the “professional” defenses of the state and the selection of those targets that would assist the neutralization of the “political” forces. We analyzed the structure of the armed forces and of other means of coercion, and we saw that much of the armed forces, a significant part of the police system, and some of the security services could not intervene—either for or against us— in the event of a coup. This was due to their remote location, dispersed deployment, or because their training and equipment were inadequate, unsuitable, or overspecialized. Then, we infiltrated the relatively small part of the apparatus that did have an intervention capability, so that much of it was technically neutralized and some of it totally subverted. This will ensure for us the neutrality of much of the defenses of the state and the active cooperation of some of its parts. The infiltration of the army and police has given us an instrument: the units that we have incorporated and that form the forces of the coup. Additionally, we have prepared for the utilization of this instrument by selecting the targets on which it will be used: we have identified the physical targets that must be seized and those that will have to be sabotaged or otherwise interdicted, and we have selected the leading personalities among the potential opposition, both in and out of the government, and prepared for their arrest. But one major task has not been covered in the planning stage: the forcible isolation of the “hard-core” loyalist forces. Hopefully, the strength of those forces we have been unable to infiltrate (assuming they have an intervention capability) will not be very great. But even if they are weak in absolute terms, we dare not ignore them. To do so would be to invalidate all the measures we have taken to insulate the capital city—and ourselves—from the intervention of hostile forces. The extreme instability of the balance of forces during the active phase of the coup means that what in other circumstances would only be a minor threat could then have disastrous consequences. If the “hard-core” loyalist forces are large in relation to our own, we will indeed have to divert a considerable amount of our forces to their isolation. Though we have been unable to penetrate these “hard-core” loyalist forces, two things will probably have been achieved: (1) their number, quality, and location will be known to us, and (2) our general measures of neutralization will have reduced their overall effectiveness. Their fighting capability will not have been eroded, but, as Table 5.1 illustrates, their intervention against us will be delayed and disrupted. Table 5.1. The mechanics of intervention of the loyalist forces Phase Effect of our general measures

Police/security agency personnel raise initial alarm and seek to contact their HQ. Telephone exchanges have been seized, and cell phone relays are switched off. They must, therefore, send a verbal message.
Police/security agency HQ verify the reports and realize the seriousness of the threat. HQ tries to communicate with political leadership. As above for communications. Some messengers fail to arrive as focal traffic points are gradually occupied.
Political leadership calls for army and police intervention. As above for communications. Some units missing from their barracks; others refuse to move; others cannot move because of technical neutralization.
Political leaders begin to realize the extent of our infiltration of the armed forces and police. Loyalist troops respond. As above for communications. Only military radio links can be used to communicate with loyalist forces.
Uninfiltrated forces assemble and prepare for intervention. They try to reach political leadership for a confirmation of their orders. Some defect to us, others choose neutrality, but some remain under the control of the government. Many political leaders no longer available; some have been arrested and some are in hiding.
Loyalist forces move on to the capital city or, if already within the area, move in to the city center. Airports closed and landing strips interdicted. Railways interrupted and trains stopped. City entry points controlled by our roadblocks. Loyalist forces in capital city area are then isolated by direct means. Our purpose is not to destroy the loyalist forces militarily (we can deal with their cadres administratively, after the coup) but merely to immobilize them for a few crucial hours. The tactics that will be used must be exclusively defensive: a ring of blocking positions around each concentration of loyalist forces or, if this is not possible, a similar ring around the capital city. Thus, though we will be on the strategic offensive (in the sense that we are the ones who want to change the situation in general), we will also be on the tactical defensive, and this will give us important technical and psychological advantages. By using defended roadblocks to isolate the loyalist forces, we will put the onus of initiating any fighting on them: our forces will be content to wait, and it will be the loyalist forces that will try to pass through. Should a column of loyalist forces arrive at the roadblock, their leaders will be faced by opposite numbers wearing the same uniform and belonging to the same armed force, perhaps even to the same regiment. Both sides will state that they are “obeying orders,” but interestingly enough, the “orders” of the leaders of our forces will probably appear more legitimate than those of the leaders of the loyalist troops. Owing to our arrests and our interdiction of the physical facilities, the “legitimate” orders will probably have taken an unusual form: the source of the orders to the loyalist troops will probably be somebody other than the appropriate superior in the hierarchy; the method used to convey them will probably be an unusual emergency one; and the actual orders will likely be indistinguishable in form from ones that might have been issued by the planners of a coup. Thus, the officers of the loyalist forces may have received orders stating, “Move into the city center, hold the Parliament building and the radio station.” The leadership may have added that they would be acting against the forces of a coup, but, even so, such orders would have “insurrectional” undertones. When army officers find themselves doing unusual things, their natural reaction is to try and fit them into familiar patterns; the most familiar pattern of all will be to arrive at the conclusion that the “politicians are guilty of yet another ‘mess.’ ” The most probable course of action will be to request clarification from their superior officers. It is to be hoped that these officers will have decided to remain neutral or else have been arrested; in either case, the “clarification” will never arrive. If, on the other hand, the loyalist units decide to force the roadblock, we will benefit from the tactical advantages of the defensive. These include the opportunity of choosing the place (natural obstructions such as bridges and tunnels) and the opportunity of deploying and camouflaging weapons and men. In order to make the fullest use of both the psychological and the tactical advantages, the blocking position should have a dual structure: a (largely symbolic) first line composed of some suitable physical obstacle, such as cross- parked heavy vehicles, with a few men bearing “orders” to forbid all passage; beyond this, there will be a second (military) line, much stronger numerically, with weapons and men deployed to repel an eventual assault (the operational detail involved is discussed in Appendix B). The idea is not to ambush the loyalists to inflict maximum damage—on the contrary, the defenders of the blocking position should inform the incoming loyalist forces that there is such a second line of defense in order to deter them. Because the strength of a camouflaged force is hard to assess, it can serve as a deterrent even if it is numerically weak as compared to the opposition. The situation at each blocking position will require delicate handling, and it will be necessary that the soldiers on our side understand that their primary function is to avoid combat rather than to engage in it successfully. In concrete terms, their mission will be a delaying operation rather than a decisive one, and this will have precise implications in terms of the weapons and tactics to be employed. Timing, Sequence, and Security Ideally, the timing of the coup will be completely flexible so that we can take advantage of any favorable circumstances that may arise—the temporary absence of the leadership from the capital city, for instance, or the outbreak of some coincidental civil disorders (see Figure 5.1). This flexibility, which would be highly desirable, is only rarely possible, however, because the infiltration of the army and police will be a dynamically unstable process: the circle of those who have decided to join us will grow and continue growing as a bandwagon effect is generated; but unless the coup materializes, there will eventually be a movement into neutrality or even opposition. Meanwhile, the danger of denunciation will also increase as more and more people become aware that a coup is being planned, or, at any rate, that “something is up.” The timing of the coup will therefore be dictated by the progress of our infiltration of the armed forces and police; as soon as a satisfactory degree of penetration is achieved, the coup must be executed. This implies that it will not be possible to designate a date well in advance of the coup that can be communicated to the various teams. This is just as well because it means that the date cannot be leaked to the security agencies. Actually, it is quite likely that some information about us will have reached the security agencies, but this should not affect the outcome. As the preparations for the coup proceed, more and more truthful information about our actions (“signals”) will be in circulation, but it will also be increasingly obscured by “noise.”a Figure 5.1. Operational sequence and timing. Every move we make will generate information that could eventually reach the security agencies, but the consequences and misinterpretations of our actions will generate an equal or greater amount of “noise.” This will make it increasingly difficult for the analysts of the security agencies to identify the nature of the threat because their capacity for processing information is not unlimited. This process is illustrated by Figure 5.2, in which O–Z is the normal level of “noise” received at all times, O–A is the processing capacity of the analysts at the security agencies, and X is the point beyond which the total flow of data exceeds processing capacity so that each item of real data is accorded a diminishing amount of attention.b Figure 5.2. Intelligence “noise” and analysis; area of surveillance of security agencies penetrated. Even if the security agencies could isolate the real data from the “noise,” they will not usually take immediate action. Their pro fessional instinct will be to try to uncover all the ramifications of the plot so as to be able to arrest all its participants. And it may be hoped that the coup will be executed while the security agencies are still engaged in their investigations. But their people will be aware of this timing problem and, therefore, are quite likely to respond to a possible threat by going ahead to arrest those of the planners of the coup that they have identified. This nervousness presents a special problem on the eve of the coup: our final preparations will probably generate a sharp increase in the total flow of “signals” received by the security agencies. Even without separating them from “noise,” the mere increase in the total flow of information could be interpreted as a danger signal (as it certainly would be by competent analysts) and this might trigger the arrests. In practice, it will rarely be possible to achieve total security within all the forces of the coup, and we should assume as a working hypothesis that they have, in fact, been infiltrated by the security agency. This leads to the general defensive procedures discussed in Chapter 3, but it will also have precise operational implications: (a) Each team will be told well in advance what equipment and tactics will be required to seize its particular target, but not the exact designation of the target. (b) Each team will only be told its designated target when it actually receives the signal to proceed to its seizure. (c) Each team will be alerted individually, with only as much advance warning as it requires to prepare for its particular task, instead of a general go-signal for all teams. Figure 5.3. Lead time required by teams to reach their targets by zero hour. Because the teams will have different starting points and different targets to go to, the use of any one general signal would either give insufficient warning to some teams or an unnecessarily long one to others. The longer the time between the announcement that the coup is “on” and its actual execution, the greater the likelihood that information will reach the security agencies in time to prevent the successful execution of the coup because this will be the moment at which their operatives in our ranks could send out warnings. The problem of warning time and lead time is illustrated in Figure 5.3. If we give all our teams a ten-hour warning period by sending out a general call at hour –10, then team No. 1 will just about reach its target in time, but all the other teams will have received “excess warning”; in other words, information will have been distributed before it was essential to do so. If we give all the teams a two-hour warning period, then “excess warning” will be zero but team No. 5 will reach its target several hours before team No. 1 and those defending it will probably be on a full alert. The solution appears to be a simple one: make warning time equal to lead time so that each team is alerted just in time to allow it to reach its target by the zero hour. In reality, the problem is more complex. It is not a matter of simultaneous arrival at the target but rather of the simultaneous penetration of the early warning system maintained by the security agencies of the state. If, for example, team No. 2 has to cross the entire capital city to reach its target, the security agency will probably be alerted as soon as it enters the city at, say, hour –2. Thus, by the time team No. 4 reached its target, the opposition would have had two hours to prepare for its defense. We may have very little information on the functioning of the security apparatus, but we can operate on the assumption that a team (if it is large and/or equipped with armor) will be noticed and reported as soon as it enters the capital city. We must therefore ensure: (a) the protection of our security position against an internal threat, which is achieved by minimizing “excess warning time,” and (b) the protection of our security position against external observation, which is achieved by simultaneous penetration of the capital city area. Both aims will be achieved by sending the teams into action at a time corresponding to their “lead times” to the capital city boundary (or other applicable perimeter). This is illustrated in Figure 5.4.c Figure 5.4. Simultaneous penetration of the defensive warning system and team warning time. Into Action The actual execution of the coup will require many different qualities: skillful off-the-cuff diplomacy at a blocking position confronted by loyalist forces; instant personnel management at radio and television stations to persuade their technic